ANALYSIS OF OUR THINKER SERIES 2017-2018
The world
10 Ene 2018 – 9:00 PM
Por Minxin Pei / SPECIAL FOR THE SPECTATOR
The author of the book “China’s Crony Capitalism”, about the economy and politics in the Asian giant, and government professor at Claremont McKenna College is surprised by the president's strengthened horizon.
The new widespread opinion is that Xi will be ableChina has once again defied expectations. In general, President Xi Jinping was expected to, the leader of the Chinese Communist Party, will face his toughest test to date in October, when the PCC convened its XIX National Congress to elect its new leadership. Although Xi was guaranteed a second five-year term, It was believed that he would run into strong opposition if he refused to name a successor.. But that's exactly what he did and the opposition never materialized..
The reason is simple: Xi was prepared. Since taking office in 2012, launched a sustained crackdown on civil society, unleashing a wave of repression that few believed possible in post-Mao China. He also carried out a large-scale anti-corruption campaign, that conditioned and even eliminated his potential political rivals, which allowed him to consolidate his power quickly.
Before, when Chinese security agents kidnapped Xiao Jianhua, a billionaire born in China and based in Hong Kong, to appear as a potential witness against some senior leaders, Any resistance that still existed to Xi's push for greater authority was decimated.. However, to strengthen his position even further in the face of Congress, A sitting Politburo member who was seen as a possible successor was abruptly arrested on corruption charges in July.
When Congress finally arrived, Xi capitalized on this moment to install two of his allies in the Politburo Standing Committee, the main decision-making body of the party. Y, by preventing the PCC from appointing a successor, has opened the door to a third term in 2022.
Judging by any conventional criteria, Xi has emerged from 2017 more powerful than ever. The question now is whether he can use that power to translate his vision for China. —particularly for its economy— in a reality.
On this front, Xi made significant progress in his first term, single-handedly cornering the Chinese bureaucracy to implement its ambitious but risky “One Belt” initiative, a route”. This plan involves the use of financing, Chinese materials and expertise to build infrastructure linking countries in Asia, Africa and Europe with the global economic giant that China has become.
But, even with his significantly greater power, Xi's continued success in implementing his economic vision is uncertain, at best, precisely due to the ideological indoctrination and repression that underpins their authority. Despite the barrage of propaganda praising his vision for China, It is unlikely that many Chinese, including members of the PCC, truly believe that the future of their country lies in a centralized, fear-based authoritarian regime.
Actually, While it is difficult to find open resistance to Xi's vision —after all, It is something that today is excessively dangerous—, passive resistance is widespread. And Xi's toughest opponents are not members of China's small dissident community, but the party bureaucrats who have borne the brunt of his anti-corruption campaign, not only by losing illicit income and considerable advantages, but also by being the subject of relentless fear of politicized investigations.
Unless Xi can regain the support of mid- and lower-level party officials, his plan to transform China could be diluted. After all, no matter how powerful it may be, cannot escape the reality described by the ancient Chinese proverb: “The mountains are high and the emperor is far away.”. Y, without the promise of sufficient material reward, China's bureaucrats can ascribe to the logic that prevailed among citizens of the former Soviet bloc countries: “We pretend to work and they pretend to pay us”.
Beyond a recalcitrant bureaucracy, Xi could face a major challenge from the so-called CCP Youth League faction, associated with former president Hu Jintao. With two seats on the new seven-member Politburo Standing Committee held by Hu's protégés, a power struggle between the Youth League and Xi's faction cannot be ruled out.
Of course, Xi may be able to overcome Youth League resistance. After all, has already largely defeated the faction linked to former President Jiang Zemin, which previously constituted the most powerful antagonistic group within the PCC. But even if Xi defeats the Youth League, will be left with a more fractured and discouraged regime.
Xi also faces policy challenges. On the economic front it will have to deal with growing debts and excess capacity that, along with the turn towards protectionism in the United States of President Donald Trump, could further depress growth. In foreign policy, Xi will also face a deteriorating relationship with the United States, fueled by the growing North Korean nuclear threat and China's own aggressive behavior in the South China Sea.
The new widespread view is that Xi will be able to crush his colleagues in 2022, beyond its performance in the coming years. Maybe so. But political authority is ephemeral, especially for leaders who lack strong economic backgrounds. For now, Xi and his followers have reason to celebrate. But they should not be confident that they will be able to lift the cup again.
Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2017.www.project-syndicate.org
